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Justification for immunity in this case is likewise not found in the
assertion that other remedies are available to the injured spouse. Some
courts have suggested that divorce or criminal sanctions brought against
the defendant are sufficient." Aside from the limited application of these
remedies,32 they are in all cases inadequate because they do not compensate the plaintiff for his injuries. 3
Finally, post divorce suits for personal torts have been barred based
upon the admonition that divorce should not open the door to litigation and
should act as a final settlement of tort claims between parties.3 4 Where
the right of action arose before marriage, the marriage was an obstacle
to its enforcement; removal of the obstacle by divorce should no more
affect the right of action for a tort than it would affect a similar right of
action for property or in contract.
As the result of the instant case, a strongly criticised legal anomaly
has been extended to circumstances which by their unique character
defy all rational justifications which can be offered for similar situations. 5 It appears, however, that if the slightest deviation from the
blanket immunity of the common law is to be made, the cry for help
must first be heeded by the legislature. 6 From all indications, the courts
are either unwilling or unable to abolish a rule of law which has been
obsolete for more than half a century.
PHIIrP GERSON

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND
THE CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE
At the voir dire examination in the petitioner's trial for murder in
a state court of Illinois, the prosecution successfully challenged for cause
forty-seven of the ninety-six prospective jurors under the authority of
the following statute:
In trials for murder it shall be a cause for challenge of any
juror who shall, on being examined, state that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed
to the same.'
31. See note 8 supra.
32. These remedies would not even apply to the instant case, for the parties are already

divorced and no criminal action could be brought against the defendant for ordinary
negligence.
33. See Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1939).
34. See note 9 supra.

35. See note 28 supra.

36. Judicial restraint seems to be the watchword for leaving changes of such magnitude
to the legislature. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Corren v. Corren,
47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950).
1. Il. Rev. Stat., chs. 38, 743 (1959).
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The voir dire questioning was generally superficial; no systematic inquiry was made to determine the extent to which a venireman's objections to capital punishment would impair his ability to render an
impartial verdict. 2 Only five of the forty-seven veniremen thus dismissed
declared themselves unconditionally opposed to capital punishment. Six
others said merely that they did not believe in the death penalty; they
were not asked whether they could nevertheless impose it upon a finding
of guilt. In no case was a prospective juror asked whether his scruples
regarding capital punishment would bias his determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence.
The jury found the defendant guilty and imposed the death penalty.
The Supreme Court of Illinois denied post-conviction relief,' and on
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States,4 held, reversed:
the imposition of the death penalty by a jury from which all persons who
harbor reservations about capital punishment are systematically excluded
is a denial of due process of law and of the right to trial by an impartial
jury. A prospective juror who professes scruples against the death pen2. The following excerpts from the voir dire examination are contained in Brief for
Petitioner at Appendix 1, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968):
PETER F. COSENZA
*

*

*

Q. Do you have a conscientious or a religious scruple against the infliction of
the death penalty in a proper case?
A. Yes.
Mr. Kissane: Cause, Judge.
The Court: All right, step aside.
(Prospective juror excused.)
JOHN M. KRIZ
The Court: Let's get these conscientious objectors out of the way, without wasting any time on them. Ask him that question first.
Mr. Kissane: Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Kriz, do you have a conscientious or a religious scruple against the
infliction of the death penalty in a proper case?
A. No, not in a proper case.
Q. Now, if it should be your opinion, along with the other eleven jurors, and
you're one of the twelve in this case, do you understand that the only thing you
are to consider is what the facts are as to what is testified to under oath and that
then you follow the rules of law as given by his Honor Judge Salter and you
retire to the jury room and, based on the evidence as you have heard it here
in the courtroom, the rules of law as given by the presiding judge, it should be
your opinion, along with the other eleven jurors, that the defendant Witherspoon
is guilty of murder and that the proper penalty is that of death in the chair, would
you say so by signing a guilty verdict?
A. Yes, sir.
VIOLET C. LAYMAN
*

*

*

Q. Do you have a conscientious or religious scruple against the infliction of the
death penalty in a proper case?
A. Yes, I do.
The Court: Now, you see, you should have asked that first. Step aside.
(Prospective juror excused.)
3. 36 II. 2d 471, 224 N.E.2d 259 (1967).
4. 389 U.S. 1035 (1968).

19691

CASES NOTED

alty may not be automatically disqualified from serving in a capital case
unless his beliefs are such as to (1) bias his determination of the primary
issue of guilt or innocence, or (2) prevent him from considering the death
penalty as a possible punishment upon a finding of guilt. Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
The challenge for cause of jurors scrupled against capital punishment was a necessary adjunct to trials of capital crimes in an era when
conviction carried with it a mandatory sentence of death.5 Given the requirement of unanimity, a single juror could deny the state a fair trial
if his views with respect to capital punishment should predispose him
to acquit despite convincing evidence of guilt. To avoid juror nullification
of capital crimes, it became the universal practice to exclude from capital
juries all those who entertained conscientious objections or other scruples
against the death penalty.6
This historic justification for the challenge for cause of jurors with
scruples against the death penalty has been largely obviated by the adoption in most capital jurisdictions7 of statutes which vest in the jury an
absolute discretion as to choice of punishment. These statutes fall into
two major categories. One simply leaves to the jury, upon a finding of
guilt, the decision whether to assess either the death penalty or life imprisonment.8 The other makes the death penalty mandatory unless the
jury qualifies its verdict with a recommendation of mercy, which results
in a sentence of life imprisonment. In addition, there are several variations in the procedures by which the jury exercises its sentencing discretion,' ° but there are no significant differences among these variants
with regard to the use of the challenge for cause against jurors opposed
to the death penalty.
This general shift away from compulsory capital punishment is, at
least in part, the reflection in law of the more humanitarian ethos prevailing in contemporary society. There is also a highly pragmatic reason
for the change: convictions are easier for the prosecution to obtain if a
sentence of death is not the mandatory penalty. When the moral conscience of the jury is offended by the prospect of the execution of the
defendant, it is not unlikely that the jury will vote for acquittal when
it is the only alternative to the repugnant result."
5. See, Comment, Jury Challenges, Capital Punishment, and Labat v. Bennet: A Reconciliation, 1968 DUKE L.J. 283, 295.
6. Id.; see also note 11 infra.
7. For a list of those states in which capital punishment has been abolished in whole
or in part, see Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 527, n.7 (concurring opinion of Justice Douglas).

8. ALA. CODE, Tit. 14, § 318 (1959) provides, "Any person who is guilty of murder in the
first degree, shall, on conviction, suffer death, or imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, at
the discretion of the jury."
9. FLA. STAT. § 919.23(2) (1967) provides, "Whoever is convicted of a capital offense and
recommended to the mercy of the court by a majority of the jury in their verdict, shall
be sentenced to imprisonment for life."
10. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 525 (concurring opinion of Justice Douglas).
11. See, e.g., State v. Molnar, 133 N.J. 327, 334, 44 A.2d 197, 202 (1945), for a statement of the thesis of juror nullification.
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Notwithstanding the general disappearance of the historic justification for the challenge for cause, it remains in effect in every capital
jurisdiction with the exceptions of South Dakota 2 and Iowa. 3 The basic
principle advanced to justify this result is juror impartiality: jurors must
be free of bias with respect to all of the issues in a case, both as to penalty as well as to guilt, in order to remain neutral between the prosecution and the defense. This reasoning was advanced three-quarters of a
century ago in the leading case of Logan v. United States:'4
As the defendants were indicted and to be tried for a crime
punishable with death, those jurors who stated on voir dire that
they had "conscientious scruples in regard to the infliction of
the death penalty for crime" were rightly permitted to be challenged by the government for cause. A juror who has conscientious scruples on any subject, which prevent him from standing
indifferent between the government and the accused, and from
trying the case according to the law and the evidence, is not an
impartial juror.'"
In addition to the principle of neutrality, the exclusion of jurors who
are opposed to capital punishment has been justified on the ground that
the state, as well as the defendant, has rights at the trial of a capital offense; specifically, the statutory right to seek the imposition of the death
penalty. To allow scrupled jurors to serve, it is argued, would foreclose
the possibility of one of the penalties authorized by the legislature being
levied and thus deny the state a fair trial on the issue of punishment. 6
Finally, use of the challenge for cause in jurisdictions where capital
punishment is optional has been defended on the ground that jurors are
required to have an open mind on the question of punishment. In other
words, the statutory discretion reposed in the jury necessitates a neutral
state of mind so that there can be a meaningful exercise of that discretion. Persons who entertain conscientious scruples against capital
punishment are unable to maintain this state of mind because their decision on the penalty to be imposed is predetermined by those scruples.
The Supreme Court of California has expressed this view thus:
The statute calls for the exercise of a legal discretion, not
for the unswerving application of views formulated before trial
12. See State v. Garrington, 11 S.D. 178, 76 N.W. 326 (1898).
13. "The statute authorizes [capital] punishment, in the discretion of the jury, . . .
but the state has no right to a trial by jurors who have no objection to inflicting the death
penalty, except as it can secure them by challenging peremptorially those who have such
objections." State v. Lee, 91 Iowa 499, 502, 60 N.W. 119, 121 (1894). See also, State v.
Wilson, 234 Iowa 60, 11 N.W.2d 737 (1943).
14. 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
15. Id. at 298.
16. State v. Leland, 190 Ore. 598, 277 P.2d 785 (1951).

17. See Commonwealth v. Pasco, 332 Pa. 439, 2 A.2d 736 (1938) ; State v. Juliano, 103
N.J. 663, 138 A. 575 (1927).
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that will compel a certain result no matter what the trial may
reveal."8
The defect in the foregoing rationalizations is obvious. They presuppose that all hostility to the death penalty is tantamount to true conscientious objection, i.e., unequivocal opposition in every case. Yet
typically no attempt is made at the voir dire examination to ascertain
whether such is in fact the case; instead, a standardized question such
as the following is put to the veniremen:
Do you have a conscientious or religious scruple against the
infliction of the death penalty in a proper case? 9
It is reasonable to assume that a juror who is not wholly comfortable with
the idea of capital punishment will tend to answer "yes" to the question
even though his objection is not so strong as to be classed a "conscientious or religious scruple." In short, such a voir dire question fails to
differentiate among the wide variety of objections which people commonly hold and which are symbolized by an affirmative response to the
above question. ° Nevertheless, such an answer generally results in immediate dismissal of the venireman from the panel without any inquiry
as to whether he is capable of returning a verdict based on the law and
the facts of the case." Furthermore, a prospective juror who acknowledges scruples against the death penalty but attempts to qualify his answer by saying he can disregard his personal beliefs if instructed to do so
is nonetheless not qualified to serve, in a majority of jurisdictions. 2
The practical result of this voir dire procedure is to eliminate many
prospective jurors who do not adhere to genuine conscientious scruples
against capital punishment but who are, instead, merely hesitant to impose it. Practically nowhere is complete opposition to the death penalty
requisite to a challenge for cause. 3 On the contrary, the cases are numerous in which challenge for cause has been sustained against a juror whose
opinions in regard to the death penalty were merely in the nature of reluctance to see it exercised. Thus, jurors who are opposed but would
18. People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 575, 305 P.2d 1, 7 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930
(1957).
19. See, e.g., note 2, supra.
20. "[Ilt cannot be assumed that a juror who describes himself as having 'conscientious
or religious scruples' against the infliction of the death penalty . . . thereby affirms that he
could never vote in favor of it or that he would not consider doing so in the case before
him." Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 515-16, n. 9.
21. See People v. Hoyt, 20 Cal. 2d 306, 125 P.2d 29 (1942). Contra, People v. Stewart,
7 Cal. 140 (1857); Atkins v. State, 16 Ark. 568 (1855).
22. "By the weight of authority a juror is incompetent in a capital case who states
that he has conscientious scruples against finding the defendant guilty of an offense punishable with death, although he further states that, if satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of
defendant's guilt, he would render a verdict accordingly." State v. Williams, 50 Nev. 271,
278, 257 P. 619, 621 (1927). Contra, Stratton v. People, 5 Colo. 276 (1880).
23. See, e.g., Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 461, 88 N.W. 789 (1902). One of the very few cases
to require absolute opposition by the juror to the death penalty as a prerequisite to a challenge for cause is State v. Narten, 99 Ariz. 116, 407 P.2d 81 (1965).
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sometimes condemn, 4 or who are opposed in most instances,25 or who
incline to oppose 26 have been held properly dismissed for cause. Such a
rule is paradoxical in that, while its rationale is to obtain jurors impartial
as to punishment, its tendency is to empanel jurors favorably disposed
to the death penalty. In Florida, for example, it has been held proper to
systematically exclude jurors who are inclined to recommend mercy.
The perfunctory type of voir dire inquiry discussed above has a further deficiency; it ignores all questions of the effect, if any, of conscientious
scruples or other objections upon the juror's determination of the threshold issue of a defendant's guilt or innocence. The irony of this omission
is that the challenge statutes of many states are couched not in terms of
objections to capital punishment, as in Illinois, 2' but in terms of opinions
affecting a consideration of the defendant's guilt. The Florida statute is
typical:
No person whose opinions are such as to preclude him from
finding any defendant guilty of an offense punishable with death
shall be allowed to serve as a juror on the trial of any capital
offense.29
Thus the anomaly exists that the purported challenge statutes of many
states do not, if read literally, actually authorize the challenge for cause
of persons scrupled against or otherwise opposing the death penalty,
absent a further showing of prejudice against a finding of guilt. However,
in rejecting the argument that since a juror has an absolute discretion to
recommend mercy he should not be disqualified for scruples against
capital punishment so long as he is neutral on the issue of guilt, the Supreme Court of Florida construed the statute to require, as a matter of
policy, juror impartiality on both the issue of guilt and the issue of punishment." Similar statutes in other jurisdictions are uniformly so construed."
The practical motivation for such construction, which is in no way
authorized by the language of the statutes, is clearly a fear of juror nullification in capital cases. In Florida, for example, this fear of sabotage has
been expressed quite bluntly:
It is not unlikely that such a [scrupled] juror would vote
24.
25.
26.
27.

Untreiner v. State, 146 Ala. 26, 41
Mickens v. State, 149 Ga. 185, 99
State v. McIntosh, 39 S.C. 97, 17
Pitts v. State, 185 So.2d 164 (Fla.

So. 285 (1906).
S.E. 779 (1919).
S.E. 446 (1893).
1966).

28. ILL. REV. STAT., chs. 38, 743 (1959).
29. FLA. STAT. § 932.20 (1967).

30. "It is . . . not enough that a juror be able fairly and impartially to determine guilt
or innocence. It is equally essential that he be free of any preconceived opinions, beliefs, or
convictions which will prevent or preclude his joining in a verdict which will take the life
of the defendant." Piccott v. State, 116 So.2d 626 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 293
(1960).
31. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ladetto, 349 Mass. 237, 207 N.E.2d 536 (1965); People
v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957).
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"not guilty" merely to avoid the death penalty, if six other
jurors refused to join in a recommendation of mercy.12
And in California, where a similar statute was interpreted in like manner,
the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Traynor, asserted that it
would be a usurpation of the legislative power to seat jurors opposed to
the death penalty even though they were able to return a verdict of guilty,
because this would probably work "a de facto abolition of capital punishment.,33

It is arguable that such "de facto" abolition of capital punishment is
within the scope of statutes which vest in the jury an absolute discretion
as to whether one found guilty of a capital offense shall live or die. The
death penalty will not fall into desuetude unless there is a substantial
segment of community opinion opposed to it, and the reflection of the
"conscience of the community" is a major justification for the adoption
of jury discretion in sentencing the guilty. Be that as it may, the apprehension of chaos in the administration of criminal law (specifically in
capital cases) is a compelling force in those jurisdictions which require
a unanimous verdict on both guilt and the penalty to be assessed. For
example, in capital cases in federal courts84 and in certain state courts"5
no verdict can be returned by a jury agreed on guilt but divided as to
punishment. Under such a rule, a single juror opposed to capital punishment can hang the jury and cause a mistrial.
One final aspect of the use of the challenge for cause merits attention: the determination of the qualifications of a venireman is a matter
resting wholly within the discretion of the trial judge. 6 This discretion
extends to the dismissal of veniremen sua sponte, i.e., in the absence of
challenge by the prosecution.87 Furthermore, the judge's interpretation
of the applicability of the governing challenge statute to a particular
venireman is generally final: his decision will not be reversed unless the
defendant can demonstrate prejudice in being required to accept an unqualified juror. 38 Thus, the exclusion of prospective jurors who can qualify on the death penalty (but who are nevertheless desirable from the
defendant's point of view because not enthusiastic about capital punishment) is irremediable. It is said that a defendant is not entitled to any
particular juror; his right is that of rejection rather than selection. Therefore there is no reversible error committed in wrongfully dismissing a
32. Piccott v. State, 116 So.2d 626, 628 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 293 (1960).
33. People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 576, 305 P.2d 1, 7 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930
(1957).
34. Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948).
35. See, e.g., People v. Hicks, 287 N.Y. 165, 38 N.E.2d (1941); State v. Reynolds, 41
N.J. 163, 195 A.2d 449 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1000 (1964).
36. Singer v. State, 184 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1959) ; Sims v. State, 184 So.2d 217 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1966).
37. Sims v. State, 184 So.2d 217 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966); People v. Shipp, 59 Cal. 2d 845,
382 P.2d 577 (1963).
38. Rollins v. State, 148 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1963).
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qualified juror for cause, so long as no prejudiced or otherwise unqualified
person sat on the actual jury:39
The right of an accused in respect to the panel and the final
jury are (1) that there be no systematic exclusion of any section
of the community and (2) that there be left as fitted for service
no biased or prejudiced person."
The thrust of the Witherspoon case is to expand the frontiers of due
process requirements in criminal law. Yet the scope of the decision is
rather limited. It comprehends, first of all, only those criminal trials
which are also capital cases. It has no application whatsoever to jurisdictions in which the jury determines only the question of guilt while
sentencing is left to the trial court. Reduced to its essence, the mandate
of Witherspoon is that, where the power of life and death is reposed in
a jury, the challenge for cause may not be employed to exclude from the
jury persons whose objections to capital punishment fall short of unequivocal opposition:
The most that can be demanded of a venireman in this
regard is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and that he not be irrevocably committed,
before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death
regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in
the course of the proceedings. If the voir dire testimony in a
given case indicates that veniremen were excluded on any
broader basis than this, the death sentence cannot be carried
out.... 4 1
Thus the permissible scope of the challenge for cause is to be restricted
to those who are genuine conscientious objectors rather than those who
are merely "opposed" to capital punishment.
In short, what the Supreme Court has done is to repudiate the fallacious reasoning whereby a majority of states equate, for challenge purposes, one who opposes capital punishment generally with one who condemns it universally.
Yet this distinction is neither very subtle nor very new. Long ago a
few courts held that mere theoretical opposition to capital punishment
is not a sufficient basis to exclude a juror for cause in the absence of a
further showing that his opinions are such as to preclude a rendition of
a fair verdict on the law and the evidence of the case.12 Much more recently, the difference between conscientious scruples and other objections
39. United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1954).
40. Tuberville v. United States, 303 F.2d 411, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 946 (1962).
41. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 (1968), n. 21 (emphasis in original).
42. See, e.g., Stratton v. People, 5 Colo. 276 (1880); People v. Stewart, 7 Cal. 140
(1859); Atlins v. State, 16 Ark. 568 (1855).
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was thoroughly delineated in an opinion by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Tuberville v. United States:4 3
Opposition to capital punishment may be for any one of a
variety of reasons. They range from an unshakeable religious
conviction as stark as the Old Testament Commandment to a
mere intellectual or philosophical distaste. Not all "opposition"
to the penalty creates incompetence for jury service. So not all
who are "opposed" to capital punishment are necessarily unqualified for service in a capital case. The nub of disqualification on this ground is whether the opposition is of such nature
as to preclude an impartial judgment on the facts and the law
of the case to be tried.44
Recognizing the deficiency in a challenge procedure which failed to make
the fundamental distinction between conscientious scruples and other
opposition, the court went on to
urge upon the District Court that a better practice would be to
proceed one more step in this questioning on voir dire to ascertain in general terms the weight of the opposition the juror
entertains, when measured against his ability to render a fair
and impartial verdict in the case on trial, based upon the evidence presented in that case and the law applicable thereto.4
This is the same proposition for which Witherspoon stands, i.e., that
the voir dire inquiry must be expanded in a meaningful way to discover
the venireman's true position in regard to capital punishment. The net
result is that the challenge for cause of opponents of capital punishment
may be properly used only against
those who [make] unmistakably clear (1) that they would
automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment
without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the
trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward
the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial
decision as to the defendant's guilt.4"
Only if this formula is followed may a state constitutionally execute a
defendant sentenced to death by a jury.4 7 Otherwise, the court will have
43. 303 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 946 (1962).
44. Id. at 419. This case is cited by Justice Black in his dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Harlan and White, in Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 532. The gravamen of the dissent
is that being not opposed to capital punishment is by no means tantamount to favoring it.
Thus, in the view of the dissenters, the conclusion of the majority that a jury qualified on
the death penalty is more likely to return a sentence of death is without foundation in logic.
45. Tuberville v. United States, 303 F.2d 411, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 946 (1962).
46. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522, n.21 (emphasis in the original).
47. Id.
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crossed the line of "neutrality" and produced a jury "uncommonly willing
to condemn a man to die."4' 8
This is not the end of the matter, however. Questions arise as to a
defendant's remedies when his constitutional right to a jury impartial on
the issue of punishment is violated. The answers of Witherspoon are
clear. In no case does its holding invalidate the conviction of guilt.49
Thus, petitioner Witherspoon remains convicted of murder; only his
sentence of death was overturned. Secondly, the decision is not applicable
to a jury's rendition of any punishment less than death.50 Accordingly,
in the case of Bumper v. North Carolina,5 decided the same day as
Witherspoon, the Supreme Court held that Bumper could not sustain his
attack on the conviction of rape since the jury assessed his penalty at
life imprisonment. Because the constitutionally repugnant bias in favor
of capital punishment did not materialize, there was no prejudice. The
error in the death-qualification of the veniremen was harmless.
Thus the apparent meaning of Witherspoon is that the unjustified
exclusion for cause of veniremen opposed to capital punishment is a violation of a defendant's fourteenth amendment right to due process of law
and of the sixth amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. However,
such violation is irremediable unless the defendant was actually prejudiced by having been sentenced to death. In that event, the sentence of
death, but not the conviction of guilt, will be reversed. In short, the rights
guaranteed by the Witherspoon decision are not of such kind that their
infringement will ipso facto vitiate the entire proceedings.
This result will, no doubt, be less than satisfactory to those who
believe that a jury qualified on the death penalty has a greater propensity
to convict than one not so qualified, quite apart from a greater tendency
to return the capital sentence. If this assertion is true, it results in an
obvious denial of due process on the issue of guilt:
(1) Under modern statutes the guilt issue has been separater from the punishment issue. (2) The necessity which justified death-qualification under the old mandatory, one-issue
statutes no longer obtains. (3) A jury qualified to the prosecution's satisfaction on the punishment issue is correspondingly
disqualified from the defendant's standpoint on the guilt issue.
(4) The logical consequence is that when the same jury decides
both issues, the defendant is denied due process of law through
having forced upon him a partial jury on the most critical issue
in the case--that of guilt or innocence.5 2
48. Id. at 520-21. In this vein, the Court further stated, "Whatever else might be said of
capital punishment, it is at least clear that its imposition by a hanging jury cannot be squared
with the Constitution." Id. at 523.
49. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522, n.21.
50. Id.
51. 391 U.S. 543 (1968). This case has been cited and followed directly by Seals v. State,
213 So.2d 645 (Ala. 1968); State v. Peele, 274 N.C. 106, 161 S.E.2d 568 (1968).
52. Oberer, Does Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punishment
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This position was urged upon the Supreme Court in Witherspoon and
was squarely rejected because "the data adduced by the petitioner ...
are too tentative and fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to
the death penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of
guilt."53 The contention was also rejected by the Court in Bumper v.
North Carolina54 where petitioner was not sentenced to death and therefore had to rely solely on the due process argument. It is true, however,
that the Supreme Court did not entirely foreclose the possibility of the
future establishment of this proposition.55 Nonetheless, the argument
that a death-qualified jury is partial to the prosecution on the issue of
guilt has been expressly rejected by the lower federal courts in Pope v.
United States,5 6 Tuberville v. United States,"7 and United States v. Puff."5

The same position is adhered to by the state courts.5 9
There is support for the "partiality" thesis in only one case, Crawford v. Bounds.60 Judge Sobeloff, concurring specially, accepts the con-

tention that a death-qualified jury is more guilt-oriented than one drawn
from a random cross-section of the community. He concludes that a jury
so constituted is an infringement of the defendant's sixth amendment
guarantee of trial by an impartial jury of peers. In addition, Judge
Sobeloff would apparently agree with the concurrence of Justice Douglas
in Witherspoon that due process of law is vitiated by a voir dire procedure

which excludes a proportion of the venire large enough to destroy the
representative character of the jury. It must be remembered, however,
that the major opinion in the case bases its holding upon different legal
grounds. 6 '
Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 545, 555 (1961). This
article is a leading exposition of the thesis that belief in capital punishment and readiness to
convict are correlatives. See also, Comment, Jury Challenges, Capital Punishment, and
Labat v. Bennet: A Reconciliation, 1968 DuKE L.J. 283, 295-99; Wilson, Belief in Capital
Punishment and Jury Performance, Brief for Petitioner at Appendix 4, Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Further psychological studies are cited by Note, Allowing
Challenge for Cause to a Prospective Juror Opposed to Capital Punishment, 45 N.C.L. REv.
1070, 1072, n. 14 (1967).
53. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517.
54. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
55. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520, n. 18.
56. 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967).
57. 303 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 946 (1962).
58. 211 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1954).
59. See, e.g., State v. Childs, 269 N.C. 307, 152 S.E.2d 453 (1967).
60. 395 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1968).
61. Crawford was decided before Witherspoon and reached the same conclusion independently, i.e., that a denial of due process results when a defendant is tried and sentenced to
death by a jury predisposed to capital punishment. But in reversing the conviction of murder
and the sentence of death, the court went further and placed the decision on an alternate
ground: that there is a denial of equal protection of the laws when there is systematic
exclusion of a cognizable segment of society, i.e., objectors to capital punishment. "Such
disqualification prevents the jury in its function of determining the issue of guilt from being
fairly representative of the community, and thus violates equal protection of the laws."
Crawford v. Bounds, 395 F.2d 297, 308 (4th Cir. 1968). Thus this court goes further than
any other in opening up to constitutional attack convictions returned by a death-qualified
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Judicial interpretation of Witherspoon has been sparse at the date
of this writing6 2 because very little time has elapsed since the decision was
handed down, and because there have been very few sentences of death
to appeal. However, a few cases demonstrate that the lower federal and
state courts are experiencing little difficulty in the application of the
Witherspoon doctrine. In Commonwealth v. Wilson,' appellant's challenge of his conviction of murder in the first degree was rejected. The
court noted that appellant could not rely on Witherspoon because the
jury had recommended mercy, but that even if it had not done so, he
would still lack grounds for asserting denial of his constitutional right to
a jury impartial on the issue of punishment. At his trial, no juror was
challenged for cause for stating that he had scruples against capital punishment. "The District Attorney always went on to ask whether the juror
could in no case impose the death penalty. Only if the juror stated that
he never could vote for a death penalty was he challenged for cause."6 4
Such a voir dire proceeding would seem to be wholly consistent with the
requirements of the Witherspoon decision.
In the federal courts, the sentence of death was invalidated in the
Fifth Circuit case of Spencer v. Beto 5 because all objectors to the death
penalty were excluded from the jury. In Brent v. White6" and Powers v.
Houck,6 7 also of the Fifth Circuit, the causes were remanded to their
respective state courts for determination of the effect of the newly decided.
Witherspoon case. All three of these cases illustrate the command of the
Supreme Court that the Witherspoon decision be "fully retroactive."68
In the final analysis, the future of the Witherspoon doctrine does not
rest wholly with the courts. To some extent it will be possible to avoid its
requirements by the employment of peremptory challenges against jurors
opposed to capital punishment. However, this device should not prove
to be particularly efficacious in view of the fact that peremptory challenges are limited in number and opposition to the death penalty has a
69
very substantial base of support among the American people.
jury, irrespective of whether capital punishment is imposed. The reason for this is that
"[slystematic exclusion of any recognizable, identifiable group within the community from
which a jury venire is drawn violates the equal protection clause, irrespective of a showing
of prejudice." Id. at 308.
While the Crawford case represents a genuine breakthrough, its value as precedent for
future appeals is diminished by the fact that the Supreme Court in Witherspoon had the
Crawford decision available to it and gave it only passing reference by way of a footnote.
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521-22, n. 22. In addition, the theoretical bases of the decision are
confused by the fact that no judge joined in signing the "majority" opinion and by the further fact that there are five other opinions in the case.
62. October, 1968.
63. 431 Pa. 21, 244 A.2d 734 (1968).
64. Id. at -, 244 A.2d at 739.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

No. 25548 (5th Cir. July 18, 1968).
No. 25496 (5th Cir. July 18, 1968).
No. 24946 (5th Cir. August 5, 1968).
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523, n. 22.
Public opinion polls are consistent in reporting approximately half of the American
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A more potent line of attack lies in legislative revision. As pointed
out by Justice White in his dissenting opinion7 0 the states can achieve
approximately the same results as before by the substitution of majorityvote decisions as to punishment for the requirement of jury unanimity.
An even more effective change would be the removal of all power as to
sentencing from the jury, leaving it to the trial judge. Finally, if a state
desires to achieve certainty in the imposition of capital punishment, it
can be made mandatory upon the conviction of specified crimes.
It is, however, unlikely that such revisions will find their way into the
penal codes of the states, for the historical tide has carried American
criminal law away from them. The progressive direction of reform would
seem to lie in the adoption of the bifurcated trial system in capital cases.
Under this two-stage procedure, the issues of guilt and punishment are
wholly segregated. At the first trial, all jurors who are otherwise qualified
may be seated without regard to their views on capital punishment.
Indeed, it is not even necessary to propound the traditional questions concerning scruples against capital punishment, as the prosecution will suffer
no prejudice on the issue of the defendant's guilt even from the seating
of genuine conscientious objectors. Only at the second stage of the proceedings, where an entirely new jury is empanelled, would it be necessary
to conduct a voir dire inquiry into the veniremen's beliefs in regard to
capital punishment, and only those absolutely opposed to it need be dismissed for cause. This bifurcation of issues has an important by-product:
it permits the defendant to introduce evidence at the sentencing trial in
mitigation of punishment without sacrificing his fifth amendment privilege not to take the stand at the trial of guilt or innocence.
The bifurcated trial in capital cases has been successfully utilized in
several states, including California, New York and Pennsylvania. It appears promising as a fair and workable solution to several of the problems
which have long attended the use of the challenge for cause against jurors
opposed to capital punishment. 1
STEVEN WISOTSKY
people opposed to capital punishment. See Brief for Petitioner at Appendix 3, Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
70. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 542, n. 2 (dissenting opinion of Justice White).
71. Its primary advantage, of course, is that it avoids the problem of whether deathqualified juries are in fact partial to the prosecution on the issue of guilt. The contention
that they are prejudiced is likely to be the basis of numerous appeals in the future in those
cases where the defendant was not sentenced to death. See note 52 supra and accompanying
text.

